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The Law-Based Utopia 
MIGUEL ANGEL RAMIRO AVILES 
The main aim of this paper is to describe how and why law is more 
important in one of the ideal society models, Utopia, than in the other 
four. models of ideal society - which I call Abundantia, Moralia, 
Millennium and Naturalia. I The best way to set out the argument 
intimated in the title is through a typology of ideal societies. The starting 
point is the affirmation that not every ideal society is Utopia. Not every 
detailed description of an ideal society has the same structure. The 
Spanish historian, Jose Antonio Maravall, tells us that utopian thought 
reflects a comparison between 'the experience of the real city where in 
fact men live' and 'the yearning for the ideal society that directs us 
toward stronger or less strong aspirations for reform'. This aspiration 
'appears in different forms from the earliest years of Western history' 
(Maravall, 1976, pp.13-14). The existence of a typology is basic to 
understanding how law, as a particular normative system, operates in just 
one of the ideal society models: the Utopian model of the eponymous 
book written by Thomas More. 2 
By considering some elements of the utopian model and its history, I 
will try to describe this relationship between law (and the state) and 
Utopia. If we start from the original title, we will find that what we call 
Utopia is really Concerning the Best State of a Commonwealth and the 
New Island of Utopia. In The Oxford English Dictionary, Utopia, as the 
first exemplar, is described as 'an imaginary island, depicted by Thomas 
More as enjoying a perfect social, legal and political system'. The 
utopian model has a close relationship with law, but this close 
relationship is not repeated in the other models. I want to analyse the 
reasons that justify the elimination of law and other normative systems 
from the other ideal society models. My proposal, therefore, is that only 
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in one of the ideal society models, Utopia, is law maintained as a valid 
instrument to produce the intended social transformation; law will be 
the instrument used to lead us from the present to utopia. 
For this purpose, I am going to use some of the classic utopian texts 
to explain the relationship between law and ideal societies. I believe that 
this relationship has not changed. In 1516, More created a unique model 
of the ideal society and nowadays this uniqueness remains because law 
can be seen as a useful and indispensable instrument for producing a 
radical transformation of society. I agree with Skinner that More's text 
does not introduce 'a completely new topic into Renaissance political 
thought ... the question of what constitutes the best state of a 
commonwealth was a standard subject of debate throughout the era of 
the Renaissance' (Skinner, 1987, p.125). But, as Colin Davis asserts, 
'what was original in his Utopia was the mode by which he chose to 
resolve these problems. He enquired as to the capacity of institutional, 
legal, educational and bureaucratic arrangements' (Davis, 1981, p.61). 
Of course, Utopia became a model for many later utopias. Utopian 
thought teaches us that human beings are able to transform society by 
changing the law and by creating new forms of politics which will 
improve human life. 
The first picture one has of the ideal society is the vision of paradise, 
where humanity is liberated from its chains. In paradise, the natural 
environment would not be hostile to men because it would produce 
enough material goods to satisfy all the desires and necessities a person 
can have. There would be no conflict between human beings, because 
they behave well, or because they do not have to struggle for material 
goods. If this is our general idea of ideal societies, why am I trying to 
describe the relationship between law and ideal societies? Is law 
necessary in paradise? 
Miriam Eliav-Feldon, in her book Realistic Utopias. The Ideal 
Imaginary Societies of the Renaissance, 1516-1630, starts with a basic 
question: 'Why should there be laws and law-enforcement in the perfect 
society?' This question is very important because 'prima facie one would 
have thought that in a vision of an ideal land there would be no need for 
limitations on human activities nor penalties for breaching such 
limitations' (Eliav-Feldon, 1982, p.107). This idea of the relationship 
between the ideal society and the normative system makes law and social 
imperfection complementary; society is imperfect if rules are needed to 
govern human behaviour or to distribute material goods. Perhaps, 
therefore, the only ideal societies are those where there are no rules, due 
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to a particular configuration of human nature or the natural 
environment. Colin Davis asserts, 'a society bound together and ordered 
by its formalities, may, obviously, still be perceived as a far from ideal 
society' (Davis, 1993, p.21). 
Anomia (the absence of law) is the hallmark of some ideal societies 
(Eliav-Feldon, 1982, p.108). Society is ideal if there are no laws that 
restrain liberty. Social perfection is achieved by the abolition of legal 
rules and of moral or customary rules. But, although anomic societies are 
one of the most important utopian dreams in western thought, anomia 
is a device particular to only four ideal society models; anomia and 
utopian thought are not inevitably connected.3 
The relationship between normative systems and ideal societies is 
not an easy and peaceful one. In the utopian model, 'on the one hand, 
law is seen as an important means of providing stability. On the other 
hand, law and particularly lawyers are seen as agents of instability 
because of their quibbling over insignificant points.' (Sargent, 1982, 
p.583.) Moreover, law is evaluated as a useful instrument, or else as a 
tyrannical one (Goodwin, 1978, pp.93-100, 137). Ideal society models 
and normative systems seem antithetical because, as I have pointed out, 
it is not clear why law should be necessary in a society where perfection 
has been reached. Various arguments purport to justify the elimination 
of law, but we can also find arguments for its retention. Law is an 
important aspect of utopian thought, whether the utopian argues for or 
against it (Sargent, 1995, p.76). 
In the different relationships between ideal societies and normative 
systems, especially law, four characteristic dimensions can be found: 
ambiguity or ambivalence; critique; necessity; and paradox. Ambiguity 
or ambivalence implies that each ideal society offers a different argument 
for the presence or absence of a normative system. Each ideal society has 
its own solution, and it is even possible to distinguish between two 
models of ideal society based on formalism (Davis, 1998, p.63). The 
second dimension (critique) justifies the special treatment of law in this 
paper: in all the ideal society models it is argued that law and legal 
institutions are the origin of the social imperfections and, therefore, law 
is shrewdly criticised. All the ideal society authors disapproved of the 
formulation of law in real societies and this negative evaluation results in 
the disappearance of law, except in the utopian model where confidence 
in law persists, even though law is also the main object of criticism. In 
this model, a radical, but positive, reform of law is proposed and legal 
institutions are a necessary part of the model. Lastly, the utopian model 
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also has a paradoxical dimension: first, because law is criticised, yet it is 
the main instrument used to create and maintain social perfection (Tasso, 
1999, p.303); second, because of the radically different way that legal 
roles (for example, lawyer, judge, and lawmaker) are conceived; and, 
third, because of the contradiction between the proposed reduction in 
the number of rules and the setting up of a utopian legal system that rules 
all possible actions. 
Anomic Ideal Societies 
Eliav-Feldon says there are three types of ideal society 'in which the 
central theme is the absence of laws'. The first is Abundantia, 'which is 
not a description of a community but of a paradise for the individual 
who seeks total freedom from restraint, obligation, and hardship' (Eliav-
Feldon, 1982, p.107). Here, people have the vastest possible sphere of 
freedom because 'in Cockaygne there were satisfactions enough to 
satiate the grossest appetite' (Davis, 1981, p.21). Abundantia permits 
anomia because of the union of two elements. The first is an absolute 
abundance of material goods, which produces the second element: 
people are liberated from the yoke of basic needs and all social problems 
disappear. In this ideal society, human behaviour has been changed by 
the elimination of the tyranny of necessities (Morton, 1952, pp.11-34, 
217-22). 
The second anomic model of ideal society is Naturalia, the model 
which 'depict[s] ideal primitive societies where life is reduced to the 
barest necessities, rendering all the institutions redundant ... there are no 
rulers to exact obedience, no religion to impose moral codes, no 
institutions to create regulations. Each person satisfies his own simple 
needs without friction with his neighbours, without aspirations for 
higher things.' (Eliav-Feldon, 1982, p.107.) Life is made easier by 
reducing demand. Naturalia implies a revaluation of primitivism, 
especially legal primitivism. It is thought that less developed societies 
have a superior standard of living and that anomia is the acme of this 
way of life (Lovejoy and Boas, 1935, pp.14-15). In primitive society, 
people are completely free because, besides eliminating such artificial 
elements as law, people have reduced their basic needs, due to the 
transformation of human nature (Montaigne, 1997, pp.161-75; 
Cervantes, 1996, pp.168-74). 
In these models of ideal society, according to Eliav-Feldon, 
'behaviour is regulated by basic necessities, not by artificial laws. The 
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complete absence of social institutions, including family and property, 
eliminates all emotions and motives for crime.' (1982, p.107.) 
Satisfaction of needs is people's goal in life and is the regulative element. 
Law and political society are only required where desires and basic needs 
cannot be satisfied. Davis contends that the Arcadia and Cockaigne 
models 'assume away the basic premise on which all social constraint is 
based: nature's inability to meet all our needs or satisfy all the wants we 
are capable of conceiving. Unlimited substance overwhelms form.' 
(1993, p.2l.) Real societies, therefore, require legal rules because 
satisfaction is not guaranteed. The inevitable correlation between basic 
needs, satisfaction and social problems means that, once needs have been 
satisfied, social problems will disappear and social perfection will be 
achieved. Abundantia and Naturalia are the only models of ideal society 
which can be labelled body utopias, since both models set out to satisfy 
human needs in order to set up and maintain an ideal social system, 
without the presence of law or other normative systems (Sargent, 1994, 
pA). 
Perceived social problems will have been erased by satisfying human 
desires and necessities. In the first model, abundance of material goods 
removes problems and conflicts from society, 'not by changing the 
character of man nor by elaborate social rearrangement, but by the 
fullest private satisfaction of men's appetites' (Davis, 1981, p.21). In 
Naturalia, law is unnecessary because there is relative abundance and 
simplicity of needs. In this model, 'nature is generously benevolent 
rather than hostile, but at the same time men's desires, in particular 
sociological ones, are assumed to be moderated. There is thus harmony 
between man and nature in Arcadia which parallels a social harmony 
between men of moderation. Arcadians tend to assume that, if the 
problems of material scarcity are resolved in a world of men of 
moderation, problems of sociological scarcity will also cease to exist.' 
(Davis, 1981, pp.31-2.) 
The third of the models which Eliav-Feldon presents as anomic is 
that formed by 'a community of people so learned or so pious by nature 
that they require no external rules of conduct - instinctively all their 
actions would be moral ... Such a vision is based on the assumption that 
certain people in this world are intrinsically good, so that by careful 
selection and with the aid of learning, a community could be formed of 
individuals who would always act according to reason (or ethical values) 
without any guidelines artificially laid down by social institutions.' 
(1982, p.108.) Davis affirms that in this model 'the message remained 
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simple: as ungodliness caused corruption so godliness was the essential 
path to social perfection' (1991, p.330). My argument is that this third 
model of anomic society represents Moralia as much as Millennium (a 
perfect religious society of the future) because these two models of ideal 
society agree on this material point about human nature (Davis, 1981, 
p.46). Both models show how human nature changes until a society of 
angels is achieved, a community of rational people who always know 
what is right and behave accordingly. An example is the true Christians 
described by Luther (Lutero, 1990, pp.21-65). Human perfection and its 
expression in conduct contributes to social harmony (Goodwin, 1978, 
p.67). 
The human disposition in these two models of ideal society means 
that it will be possible to do without legal rules because there will be 'a 
code of categorical prescriptions, enforceable by conscience, not by 
coercion, which usually directs human behaviour towards actions which 
are at least harmless to other individuals, and at best beneficial to them' 
(Goodwin, 1978, p.55). People, with their new human nature, will feel 
bound by the rules which guide them along the right path, and the 
possibility of behaviour contrary to those prescriptions is not admitted 
(Eliav-Feldon, 1982, p.107). To distinguish between the good person 
and the good subject or citizen in these models of ideal society is 
pointless because they are identical. In such societies, there are good men 
who always and inevitably obey the rules because for them the moral 
obligation is more important than legal or political obligations. This 
produces a radical improvement in the internal and external behaviour 
of individuals (see, for instance, Owen, 1991, p.110). 'Society is to be 
made harmonic by the moral reformation of every individual in society, 
and hence of every class and group.' (Davis, 1981, p.27.) In both models, 
to recover prelapsarian human nature or to create a new human nature 
will produce personal and social perfection. It will also bring about the 
elimination of all intersubjective conflicts and, therefore, it will be 
possible for this world to do without law. In these models, there is no 
imposition of rules, but inevitably people, after the reform process, are 
going to behave correctly. In my opinion, behaviour which is inevitable 
and necessary needs no rules (see Claeys, 1991, pp.xxiv-xxv). 
It can be contended that in the first group of ideal societies the 
elimination of law, and other normative systems, depends on the 
benignity of the natural environment, which produces abundant goods 
for the satisfaction of desires and basic needs. This satisfaction is the 
cornerstone for creating social perfection and escaping from reality. In 
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this connection, Goodwin asserts, 'misery in an imperfect society is 
usually the result of unsatisfied need and frustrated wants, and although 
the mere satisfaction of needs may not be sufficient to constitute 
happiness, it is at least a necessary condition' (1978, p.70). Scarcity is the 
main cause of social crisis; it promotes social conflict. Moreover, law 
makes scarcity and conflict perpetual by imposing a non-egalitarian 
distributive system. In a society where people, aided by the natural 
environment, can satisfy their basic needs and conflicts of desire are 
removed, it is possible to live without law (Hill, 1997). 
Human imperfection is another basic factor which causes conflicts in 
society, so in those societies inhabited by angels (good men who are 
perfect moral agents) law will disappear because of the radical reform of 
human nature. People will never act against the self-imposed rules 
because it is impossible. There will be no lawbreaking or rule-breaking. 
This is scarcely conceivable and, in my opinion, this negates moral 
freedom because human beings cannot choose between right and wrong. 
Their good actions are not morally free, for there is no freedom if their 
behaviour is beyond human control. Such beings do not decide their own 
behaviour because it is determined by nature. Hans Kelsen thinks that in 
societies where good behaviour is guaranteed, laws are unnecessary: law 
is meaningful in a society where deviant behaviour is possible and where 
the absence of law would therefore bring about a quite different society 
(1993, pp.24, 73). But laws are not required to govern determined or 
necessary behaviour. Abundantia, Naturalia, Millennium and Moralia 
would therefore be anomic societies because good behaviour is inevitable 
due to the reform of human nature. 
There are two different paths (abundance or human perfection) to 
attaining anomic society. The material elements of human nature and the 
natural environment play an important role in the elimination of law and 
in the maintenance of the society. Their transformation causes law to 
vanish into thin air: it has no meaning or purpose. David Hume 
illustrated this situation when he analysed the necessity and functions of 
government. In An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, he 
argued the uselessness of the 'idea of justice' in societies where there is 
an abundance of material goods or where there is unlimited altruism. 
The idea of justice is pointless in societies where there is moderate 
scarcity or where society consists wholly of angels or of devils (Hume, 
1983, pp.21-2). 
In similar vein, the legal philosopher Herbert Hart argues that there 
are two evident truths that justify the existence of rules in society: limited 
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altruism and scarcity. Limited altruism means that: 
men are not devils dominated by a wish to exterminate each other, 
and the demonstration that ... the basic rules of law and morals are 
necessities must not be identified with the false view that men are 
predominantly selfish and have no disinterested interest in the 
survival and welfare of their fellows. But if men are not devils, 
neither are they angels; and the fact that they are between these 
two extremes is something which makes a system of mutual 
forbearances both necessary and possible. With angels, never 
tempted to harm others, rules requiring forbearances would not be 
necessary. With devils prepared to destroy, reckless of the cost to 
themselves, they would be impossible. (Hart, 1988.) 
On the other hand, there is scarcity: 
it is a merely contingent fact that human beings need food, clothes 
and shelter; that these do not exist at hand in limitless abundance, 
but are scarce, have to be grown or won from nature, or have to be 
constructed by human toil. These facts alone make indispensable 
some minimal form of the institutions of property (though not 
necessarily individual property), and the distinctive kind of rule 
which requires respect for it. (Hart, 1988, pp.191-2.) 
Such arguments are illustrated in Henry Neville's The Isle of Pines, 
which describes the progress from an anomic ideal society (Naturalia) to 
a nomic ideal society (Utopia). The isle inhabited by George Pine and his 
relatives was initially an Arcadian society, but became a utopian society 
due to the need for legal rules. This change was brought about by the 
radical transformation of the original situation, from a peaceful society 
(generated by abundance and altruism) to a society characterised by 
scarcity and conflict. The original 'orders' had to be altered because 
human behaviour and the distribution of goods had changed. 4 In the 
beginning, the island was Arcadian because: 
The country [was] so very pleasant, being always clothed with 
green, and full of pleasant fruit and variety of birds, ever warm, 
and never colder than England in September ... for we wanted no 
food, and living idly, and seeing us at Liberty to do our wills, 
without hope of ever returning home made us thus bold (Neville, 
1920, pp.65-6). 
This first stage is characterised by absolute satisfaction of basic needs, the 
rn
¡ a
licto a
THE LAW-BASED UTOPIA 233 
free realisation of desires, an absence of conflict and a lack of legal rules 
to infringe this natural freedom. It is a peaceful state of nature, a 
prelapsarian and pre-social situation. But everything changes when class 
distinctions develop (Neville, 1920, p.74), the population increases and 
natural goodness disappears. Then, conflict arises. The absence of 
government makes it easy for the strong to tyrannise the weak. Religious 
control is not enough and the only practicable solution is to set up a legal 
order: 
Now as Seed being cast into stinking Dung produceth good and 
wholesome Corn for the sustentation of man's life, so bad manners 
produceth good and wholesome Laws for the preservation of 
Humane Society. Soon after my Father with the advice of some few 
others of his Counsel, ordained and set forth these Laws to be 
observed by them' (Neville, 1920, p.73). 
Law, therefore, is not autonomous but depends on social conditions. 
It is unnecessary where there is a perfect natural environment and 
perfect human nature. Four out of the five models of ideal society 
assume it is possible to maintain an anomic society if (and only if) human 
nature or the natural environment, or both, are altered. However, the 
main question is whether absolute anomia would allow the establishment 
and maintenance of an ideal society. 
The proper selection of methods of social control and conflict 
resolution influence the practicality of the reform project for the ideal 
society. Goodwin asserts, 'the survival of a social system in its particular 
forms depends on the successful resolution of the conflicts of interest 
which arise where there is a plurality of desires that limited resources 
cannot satisfy', and, therefore, 'the proposed solution is consequent 
upon the manner in which the problem is conceptualised' (1978, p.82). 
All the ideal society models (anomic or nomic) maintain a strict 
relationship between the solution proposed and the problem, because all 
of them want to solve the social and political problems. 
I believe it is impossible to create an anomic society because human 
nature and the natural environment would have to be reformed to 
become perfect. It would be necessary to create a new human nature 
which would allow social life to continue without primary or secondary 
rules (Hart, 1988, pp.77-96; Raz, 1991, pp.179-88). Nor it is possible 
to reform society through the satisfaction of basic needs and desires, 
first, because this solution simplifies political problems, and, second, 
because, although it was possible to produce artificial abundance 
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(according to nineteenth-century utopians) a formal system for 
distributing goods would still be necessary due to human imperfection. 
The Role of Law in Utopia 
There is one model of ideal society, Utopia, which is an ideal society 
because of the perfection of its legal, bureaucratic and formal structures 
(Davis, 1968, p.174). In this model, law and the state are necessary 
elements for realising social reform and setting up new ways of 
governing and administering goods and people. As Giampaolo Zucchini 
asserts, the Renaissance utopians aimed to achieve earthly happiness 
through a new model of society or an alternative state, or both (1986, 
p.409). In this new model of ideal society, according to Eliav-Feldon, 
'Law is a subject that received a great deal of attention from the utopists 
and deserves close examination.' (1982, p.110.) 
Utopia admits imperfections in human nature and the natural 
environment as irreducible, but this does not mean it is impossible to do 
anything about them. Utopians admit that 'a much better life could be 
developed without changing the basic nature of the people' (Sargent, 
1975, p.91). Therefore, according to Davis, the utopian model 'focuses 
all attention on [the bureaucrat's] primary role, the implementation and 
efficient operation of a given system' (1981, p.381). The utopian model 
has created institutional perfection in order to moderate problems 
caused by limited altruism and scarcity. This perfection, based on law 
and the state, tempers the threats to society caused by the other 
imperfections (Davis, 1984, p.9). Sargent thinks that 'More's Utopians 
are infinitely better than any other people at the time, but they are not 
significantly better by nature; they are better because their social 
institutions are better.' (1975, p.89.) 
Utopia is the only model where law is considered as a necessary 
instrument to create and maintain social reform. It does not guarantee 
good behaviour (men can become criminals or sinners) and the social 
problems caused by redistribution of goods have not disappeared. But, in 
this model, though human nature and the natural environment are 
imperfect, the reasons for unfair behaviour have been eliminated, a fair 
system for distributing goods ('artificial abundance') and extensive social 
control have been established. The imperfections have been controlled 
by formal mechanisms; although they cannot eradicate them (Davis, 
1984, p.10), they reduce the adverse effects. In Utopia, More asserts that 
remedies can ease the maladies of society, but never eradicate them. 
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These remedies can be found in statutes, prescriptions, and legislation. 
In the utopian model, social and political problems do not vanish into 
thin air because human behaviour has been reformed. Human beings are 
not angels, but they live in a society with a reformed institutional 
framework and one where the roots of unfair behaviour have 
disappeared. In More's words: 
Everyone knows that if money were abolished, fraud, theft, 
robbery, quarrels, brawls, seditions, murders, treasons, poisonings 
and a whole set of crimes which are avenged but not prevented by 
the hangman would at once die out. (1999, p.l09.) 
A few people might continue to infringe the rules, however, and 
authority is necessary because men are not always virtuous. Eliav-Feldon 
asserts, 'the serious utopists of the Renaissance did not believe that it was 
possible to transform human nature completely', so, 'even in the best of 
states some coercion and restriction would be necessary' (1982, p.109). 
A negative view of human nature 'is a basic theme running throughout a 
significant number of utopian novels' (Sargent, 1975, p.89). Laws are 
born, according to Ludovico Agostino, due to peccato di Adamo which 
is indissoluble (1957, pp.24-6). The utopian is not looking for the good 
man, but the good citizen or subject. Robert Burton, for example, in his 
utopia tried to find the good man, but knew it was impossible: 
Priests should imitate Christ, charitable Lawyers should love their 
neighbours as themselves, temperate and modest Physicians, 
Politicians contemn, Noblemen live honestly, Tradesman leave 
lying and cosening, Magistrates corruption &c. but this is 
unpossible, I must get such as I may.' (1991, p.87.) 
Searching for the good man or the good citizen or subject are 
completely different because they are different goals and the instruments 
that are utilised are also different. The good citizen or subject is the goal 
of any legal system, while the good man is the goal of all morality. 
Modernity has produced a separation of spheres, so that the good citizen 
need not necessarily be a good person, although the utopians seek the 
union of both spheres (Habermas, 1990, pp.50-54). Moreover, each 
model of the ideal society is looking for a different kind of person. So, 
while anomic models try to create societies inhabited by good men, 
utopian models try to create good citizens or subjects, although they 
would also like to create good men. For example, the Moralia model 
trusts in human self-restraint, but Utopia, according to J ohann Valentin 
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Andreae, does not trust in this self-restraint (Andreae, 1999, p.187), 
because when the stringency of control by rules is reduced, according to 
Campanella, sedition appears (Campanella, 1993, p.162). I would assert 
that it is possible to differentiate between the good man and the good 
citizen or subject, so I do not agree with Davis when he states that 'in 
Utopia, or Hagnopolis, as that holy community was also called, the 
distinctions between law and morality, between good citizen and good 
man, have disappeared' (1981, p.SO). I think the basic differentiation 
between the good person and the good citizen remains in this model of 
ideal society because, if it did not, Utopia would be transformed into 
Moralia. 
I would argue that the utopian model can exist with a minority of 
good men and a majority of good citizens (Andreae, 1999, p.180). 
Societies inhabited entirely by good people are impossible, so Andreae, 
Gott, Burton, More and Campanella set up imperfect Moralias, which 
are in fact utopias. In the utopian model, there are differences between 
'those of their citizens who have internalized the ideal society's values, 
those who are capable of outward reformation only, and those who are 
potentially or actively deviant. Vivian Carol Fox has persuasively 
demonstrated that it is in this sense that deviance is integral to the 
utopian construct.' (Davis, 1993, pp.24-S.) In the utopian model, there 
are people who do things by conviction (Campanella, 1993, p.217), and 
also there are people who have adapted their external behaviour to the 
rules, but have not internalised the rules. This is possible because, 
according to Burton, men do not have a window to see the heart's secrets 
(1991, p.83). The other possibility is the person who tempts others or 
infringes the rules (legal or moral), because ubi lex, ibi praevaricatio. In 
this case, the utopian model only has one answer, law enforcement and 
penalties: 
He that commits sacrilege shall lose his hands; he that bears false 
witness, or is of perjury convict, shall have his tongue cut out, 
except he redeem it with his head. Murder, adultery, shall be 
punished by death, but not theft, except it be some grievous 
offence, or notorious offenders: otherwise they shall be 
condemned to the gallies, mines, be his slaves whom they offended, 
during their lives. (Burton, 1991, p.89.) 
The utopian model does not trust in the resolution of social and political 
problems through natural abundance, so work has an important value 
(Skinner, 1993, p.122; Kumar, 1987, p.28). In More's Utopia, for 
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example, agricultural work is obligatory. Descriptions of the natural 
environment are secondary in this type of ideal society model, because 
work transforms the environment. For instance, Patrizi's first description 
of the natural environment concerns the sterility of the land and the art 
required to produce fertility (1941, p.ll5) and More, when he 
acknowledges that Utopia's soil is not very fertile and its climate is not 
of the best, says that the Utopians protect themselves against the weather 
by temperate living and improve their soil by industry (1999, p.77). 
In the utopian model, there are powerful instruments to combat the 
social deficiencies caused by the natural environment and human nature. 
The recourse to law and the state is historically determined: in the 
Renaissance, law and the state were considered as methods by which to 
control men and order society (Maravall, 1976, p.76). It is possible to 
stipulate 1516 as the starting point of this model of ideal society. The 
true utopia is born in the Renaissance (Manuel and Manuel, 1984, p.33). 
Eliav-Feldon considers 'the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were a 
period when traditional organizations were losing ground and the 
national states were consolidating and extending their powers. Only the 
State, with its rapidly growing machinery of administration, could be 
regarded as capable of coping with the formidable volume of social and 
economic problems and with the fear of chaos.' (1982, p.ll8.) There is 
also an inevitable relationship between law and state, for example, in 
Bodin's theory of sovereignty. Maravall asserts that law is the expression 
of the political action of the state. State is law: 'the old equation of law 
= king, is now formalized as State = law' (Maravall, 1976, pA17). 
The state is an agent which can create new rules and new legal 
institutions, and enforce them. So, one of the persisting elements in the 
utopian model is a positive valuation of the existence and functions of 
the state (Bobbio, 1994, p.179). Eliav-Feldon asserts, 'the utopias depict 
centralized states that do not tolerate independent entities within them. 
There is one Law and one hierarchy of courts in these imaginary lands.' 
(1982, p.119.) The state's legal independence and the uniformity of law 
and custom are affirmed, while the judicial and legal authority of the 
church is severely curtailed (Bell, 1967, p.127). It is noteworthy that 
Weber's idea of the state is anticipated in this particular form of political 
thought (1993, p.83). 
The critique of law and the affirmation of its necessary presence in 
society are both fundamental to the utopian model of ideal society: their 
simultaneous presence gives the model a paradoxical character because 
of the ambivalence about law. Criticism of law is found in many books 
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of the time, and perhaps one of the most important is the one noted in 
Burton's Anatomy of Melancholy: 
To see so many lawyers, advocates, so many tribunals, so little 
justice; so many magistrates, so little care of the common good; so 
many laws, yet never more disorders .... To see often a most unjust 
man preside over justice, an impious man over religion, a most 
ignorant man decide questions of learning, a most lazy man 
questions of labor, a monster questions of humanity! To see a lamb 
executed, a wolf pronounce sentence, a robber arraigned, and a 
thief sit on the bench, the Judge severely punish others, and do 
worse himself! ... Laws are made and not kept; or if put in 
execution, they be some silly ones that are punished. (1991, p.51.) 
But the critique does not eliminate law from utopia because the model 
has a necessary relationship with law. Eliav-Feldon says, 'Society, 
according to our writers, can be reformed only through good laws and 
good institutions that will protect men from evil within them. The 
serious utopia is, in fact, a complex legal network of such close mesh as 
to leave individuals with very little freedom of action.' (1982, p.109.) 
The perfect social system is achieved through law which has an effect on 
human nature and distribution. Social perfectibilism is thus 
distinguishable from human perfectibilism (Goodwin, 1978, pp.4-5): 
social control is perfected and human and natural imperfections are 
allowed to remain. 
Utopia is an example of government by laws and not by arms or 
men. Government is not a personal matter, but an institutional one 
(Ferguson, 1965, p.16) and the rulers are not above the law. Tyranny is 
outlawed because most utopians equate it with government by men 
(Winstanley, 1965, pp.527, 534). The quality of government is not the 
only relevant element for attaining the optima respublica; the quality of 
the institutional framework is also vital. A radical reform of society was 
to be attained by the abolition of unfair and imperfect rules and by 
adopting new ones. Burton and Andreae considered real society (which 
could be labelled as dystopic) as the world turned upside down due to 
legal imperfections, while their own ideal societies were the normal 
societies (Burton, 1991, pp.61, 79; Andreae, 1999, p.177). Flawed rules, 
laws and formal institutions are at the root of social problems and bad 
habits. Those social maladies can be meliorated through the 
implementation of the legal systems described in their ideal societies. 
All utopian thinkers are critical of law, but only one ideal society 
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model utilises law in spite of this criticism. 'All our utopists, irrespective 
of their country, denomination, or particular background, acknowledged 
the widespread discontent with the existing legal system and, except for 
those who rejected the entire subject and took refuge in fantasy, devoted 
much thought and space in their descriptions of imaginary societies to 
offering an alternative in the form of an ideal legal system.' (Eliav-
Feldon, 1982, pp. 110-1 1.) 
Ideal Legal Systems 
The critique of law deserves further consideration, since it determined 
the kind of law which utopians advocated. The imperfections of real 
legal systems can be divided into the formal and the material. Formal 
imperfections derive from problems connected with law enforcement, 
elaboration of codes and so on, while material imperfections are caused 
by the disassociation of justice and legality. Law, as a formal framework, 
is imperfect because it is formed by a set of rules which are hard to 
understand, lengthy legal texts and unfamiliar or unknown laws. These 
formal imperfections make law unfair (Fuller, 1969, pp.38-9). A 
widespread idea among the authors of the utopian model was that 'codes 
of laws that are too long, extremely complex, open to different 
interpretations, and written in a language that most people do not 
understand, defeat their purpose' (Eliav-Feldon, 1982, p.111). These 
problems hamper purposive action, for which everybody must know 
their duties and obligations so as to adapt their conduct to them (More, 
1999, p.85; Winstanley, 1965, p.590). The utopian solution is to 
simplify the complexity of the legal system, 'so that it will be possible to 
have a system in which every individual knows exactly what is right and 
wrong and what will happen if the taboos of the society are violated' 
(Sargent, 1975, p.92). More's Utopians 'think it completely unjust to 
bind men by a set of laws that are too many to be read or too obscure 
for anyone to understand' (1999, p.85). According to Zucchini, utopians 
have as a main objective the creation of legal certainty by a schematic 
system of laws, ordained and created by a lawmaker (1986, p.417). 
Therefore, the initial solution is to create a legal system with few laws: 
the Utopians 'have very few laws, and their training is such that they 
need no more ... for the laws are very few, as I said, and they consider 
the most obvious interpretation of any law to be the fairest' (More, 
1999, pp.84-5). As Harrington states, 'the best rule as to your laws in 
general is that they be few' (1977a, p.187). In the utopian model, the 
i is o H
l.
H
240 THE PHILOSOPHY OF UTOPIA 
legal system is simplified, and that solution is part of the utopians' 
originality (Zucchini, 1986, pp.411-12). Legal rules in the ideal society 
are also interpreted in the simplest way and literally. Interpretation by 
judges, magistrates or lawyers, who may have bad intentions, is 
forbidden (Burton, 1991, p.51). Winstanley thought 'the bare letter of 
the Law' would be enough (1965, p.512). One of the discoveries of 
utopian thought is that the method of determining the sense and 
meaning of rules must be simple because even people without technical 
knowledge must be able to understand them, so that everybody is a legal 
expert. In these utopias, lawyers will disappear and the magistrate's work 
will be transformed because, although the magistrate is honest, 
intelligent and learned, he will be under the state's control. Nobody can 
interpret law because it is self-interpreting when its words are 
pronounced. There is a clear legal code which determines the sentence, 
and the function of the magistrate or judge is solely to determine guilt or 
innocence (Sargent, 1975, p.92). For instance, in Sinapia the laws do not 
give reasons, but just decree commands and prohibitions (Sinapia, 1976, 
p.116). 
There is a third innovation: utopian laws are written in the 
vernacular and Latin or French are abandoned as the language of 
codification. The laws in Burton's utopia are going to be 'plainly put 
down, and in the mother tongue, that every man may understand' (1991, 
p.86). The fourth solution to formal imperfections is the publicity of 
laws. Winstanley considers the esoteric nature of law and ignorance of 
the law a serious problem in the real world: 'if there were good Laws, 
and the People be ignorant of them, it would be as bad for the 
Commonwealth as if there were no Laws at all' (1965, p.562). 
Therefore, laws must be public. Campanella proposed that laws should 
be written on bronze tablets and displayed on the columns of the temple 
(1993, p.185). (At Gortyn in Crete the laws of the city are inscribed on 
the outer walls.) Harrington also advocated a written system: 
It shall not be lawful for the senate to require obedience from the 
people, nor for the people to give due obedience unto the senate, 
in or by any law that hath not been promulgated or printed and 
published for the space of six weeks. (1977a, p.281.) 
The fifth problem is the enforcement of the legal rules. It is one of 
the most important problems, because the authors were critical of the 
fact that laws were not strictly enforced. Laws are made, but not 
observed, said the Clerk of the Market at the City of Oxford (Burton, 
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1991, p.51). Therefore, in the utopian model, laws are strictly enforced. 
In this, the utopian model contrasts with historical reality. 
Strict law enforcement makes for inexorable laws, one of the most 
important aspects of the new legal system, because the utopians believe 
in the formative power of discipline (Oestreich, 1982, p.269). For laws 
to succeed as behavioural guides, they must be few, understandable, 
known, public, and enforced. Moral codes and educational systems, 
though necessary, are not adequate to control human behaviour. 
However, Davis thinks that 'the moral philosophy of More's Utopians 
was central to his whole design, and social morality has remained the 
issue central to utopianism' (1981, p.334). In my opinion, the role is 
central because morality is basic to the stability of social systems; moral 
principles can serve to obtain political obedience. The state therefore 
assumes the responsibility of supervising the faith and morality of its 
inhabitants (Eliav-Feldon, 1982, p.12D). Campanella set up a 
caesaropapist utopia in which the chief ruler, Hoh, had secular and 
religious (that is, moral) powers (Campanella, 1993, p.146; Manuel and 
Manuel, 1984, p.109). More thought that the doctrine that the soul dies 
with the body had political relevance: 
Who can doubt that a man who has nothing to fear but the law, and 
no hope of life beyond the grave, will do anything he can to evade 
his country's laws by craft or to break them by violence, in order 
to gratify his own personal greed? (1999, p.98.) 
The utopian models include moral exhortation as just one of the 
instruments of social transformation, because alone it is not sufficient to 
impose a social order (Davis, 1991, p.33D). Furthermore, although the 
educational system is important for reforming society because it moulds 
human behaviour, it too is not enough. Goodwin argues that education 
delineates acceptable and non-acceptable behaviours and sets up self-
restraint mechanisms (1978, p.85). Moralia is a good example because 
this model is based on reform of human nature through education. The 
utopian model also utilises the educational system to condition human 
behaviour (Eliav-Feldon, 1982, p.57), but it is not the only instrument of 
social control. This relationship between morals, religious principles and 
educational control is made plain in Utopia: 
The priests do the teaching of children and young people. 
Instruction in good manners and pure morals is considered no less 
important than learning proper. From the first they make every 
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effort to instil in the pupils's minds, while they are still young and 
tender, principles useful to the community. What is planted in the 
minds of children lives on in the minds of adults and serves to 
strengthen the commonwealth; its decline can always be traced to 
vices which arise from wrong attitudes. (More, 1999, p.102.) 
In the utopian model, therefore, law, religion and education coexist as 
compatible methods for controlling human behaviour, and 'although 
these methods can be distinguished in principle, in practice they merge 
and overlap considerably, as control is usually achieved through a 
mixture of physical, intellectual and psychological devices' (Goodwin, 
1978, p.86). The utopian model does not trust exclusively in law 
enforcement, since that would weaken the stability of the system, but 
also relies on spontaneous adherence to laws, achieved through morality 
and education. In spite of that, in Utopia, law is the last line of defence 
(Zucchini, 1986, p.415). 
The goal is to control all behaviour and this is achieved through 
strict enforcement of rules (Tasso, 1999, p.300). In the utopian model, 
we find a system of legal rules for controlling public and private 
behaviour. For example, in Campanella's social system, the state rules 
everything, even the most personal sphere (Tasso, 1999, p.310). 
Comprehensiveness is therefore another of the legal system's 
characteristics, which implies the capacity to rule all the actions a man 
can take (Raz, 1991, pp. 175-6).5 There is normative intervention from 
birth to death. Thus, according to Winstanley: 'there will be Rules made 
for every action a man can do' (1965, pp.512, 528). During that 
historical period some behaviour, nowadays considered private, was 
regulated, and other kinds of behaviour, nowadays considered public, 
first began to be regulated. Hyper-regulation or comprehensiveness was 
not thought strange because the modern state had to increase its 
presence in society with new institutions and new areas of control 
(Oestreich, 1982, pp.138, 157). Comprehensiveness does not involve 
incoherence among rules; all the laws operate under the same principles. 
It means that every possible action is regulated and, moreover, 
everybody should act in the same way. Utopian society operates on a 
general rule: 'if the law did not say expressly that you could do 
something, you could not do it' (Sargent, 1975, p.91). 
Comprehensiveness in utopia is a product of the state's 
preoccupation with the idea that every person and event is its 
responsibility (Eliav-Feldon, 1982, p.47). Every action is considered as a 
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possible cause of social disorder and there is no differentiation between 
the public and private spheres. The amalgamation of the spheres goes 
further because in that historical period, according to Oestreich, 'State 
and society were not separate entities, as they were considered to be in 
the early Nineteenth century, but formed a unity.' (1982, p.160.) 
Historically, the main material and practical problem of the legal 
system has been the separation between law and justice. According to 
Zucchini, the crisis of contemporary legal systems was explicitly 
underlined in the Renaissance utopias by demonstrating the dramatic 
separation between legality and justice, a separation that the utopians 
wished to abolish by creating social justice founded on citizens' virtue 
and the virtue of the new social and institutional systems (1986, pA23). 
We should note, however, that non-utopian political thinkers also 
offered this critique of law. One of the roots of this separation is the 
behaviour of judges and lawyers in courts, where the sense of the justice 
of laws is lost. It is human beings who create this separation; human 
conventions cause deviation from the principles of justice. Laws have 
adulterated the sense of moral rules, as More understood. Positive laws 
ought to respect the material content of the superior moral rules. The 
proposed solution to this problem was natural law theory. The perfect 
civil law is the one based on natural law precepts which represent the 
original divine laws of justice (Eliav-Feldon, 1982, p.112). Agostino 
distinguished between divine law and human law (1957, p.21), and 
More maintained the priority of divine law: 
Perhaps it will be argued that God's laws against killing do not 
apply where human laws allow it ... If mutual consent to human 
laws entitles men by special decree to exempt their agents from 
divine law and allows them to kill where he has given us no 
example, what is this but preferring the law of man to the law of 
God? (1999, p.22.) 
He criticised the injustice of law in English society and asserted that 
there are two kinds of justice: 
One for the common herd, a lowly justice that creeps along the 
ground, hedged in everywhere and encumbered with chains, and 
the other, which is the justice of princes, much more free and 
majestic, which can do anything it wants and nothing it doesn't 
want. (More, 1999, p.87.) 
By contrast, in the utopian model, law is the means for justice (Zucchini, 
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1986, pA23), and the unfair social situation has disappeared: 
At this point, I'd like to see anyone venture to compare this equity 
of the Utopians with the so-called justice that prevails among other 
nations - among whom let me perish if I can discover the slightest 
scrap of justice or fairness. (More, 1999, p.l07.) 
In short, law is an instrument for building the ideal society because 
it has been improved and these two deficiencies, formal and material, 
have been overcome. The new law is an instrument of justice because 
there is now no separation between the two. 
Conclusions 
To conclude, the utopian ideal society mode! is based on legal rules. That 
is why Utopia can cope with scarcity, which is resolved by the setting up 
of a rational system for the distribution of goods. The imperfections of 
human nature can lead to deviant behaviour, which is eliminated by the 
rigorous enforcement of law and its sanctions. The legal system is perfect 
because it is immune to these imperfections. Law is free from external 
(human) influences because it has become an idealised instrument for 
maintaining social perfection. For this reason, 'the devices to be used -
legal, educational, bureaucratic, and institutional - must not follow 
nature, since nature itself is deficient. Rather they must discipline man 
and nature to conform to them. Men must be made to conform to the 
law and not vice versa ... Laws were not to be moulded to men but men 
to be moulded by and to the laws.' (Davis, 1991, pp.371, 342.) The goal, 
in short, is to build a perfect legal and political system that resolves social 
problems and maintains social perfection for ever. 
The early modern authors of the utopian model considered law as an 
instrument with positive social functions. They did not see law as an 
instrument for oppressing people, but later utopians started to see law as 
an instrument to create freedom and security (Davis, 1992, p.513; 1993, 
pp.28-9; Maravall, 1997, p.131). So, the negative sense of freedom is 
the one exemplified in early utopian models through the absence of the 
arbitrary and the contingent. The positive sense of freedom, or 
participatory freedom, refers to when men participate in self-
government as citizens. This last sense, according to Furet, developed in 
eighteenth-century democratic theories, which offer the promise of 
freedom seen as autonomy (1998, p.65), although, in my opinion, it is 
possible to find this positive sense in Harrington's and Winstanley's 
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utopian societies, and even before (Carlyle, 1982). 
The early utopian model of society is not a hellish 'closed society', 
because there was already a concept of negative freedom at this time and 
also because 'in comparison with the methods of law enforcement in 
contemporary Europe, the proposals of utopists were relatively lenient' 
and 'the Renaissance social reformers were blissfully ignorant of the 
experience of twentieth-century civilization with totalitarian regimes' 
(Eliav-Feldon, 1982, pp.125, 127). These utopian societies are 
authoritative, but not totalitarian, though 'the [most important] 
tendency in [the twentieth] century has been to equate utopia with force, 
violence, and totalitarianism' (Sargent, 1982, p.568). Goodwin argues 
that 'although a minority of utopians have seen coercion and even 
violence as a lamentable but necessary means to change, a survey of 
utopian literature does not establish anything approaching a necessary 
and universal association of utopianism with coercive means' (1980, 
p.395). It is true that utopian writers described societies in which the use 
of force would be necessary to achieve and maintain the new society, but, 
first, it is legal coercion, and, second, 'the utopian need be no more 
coercive than were the liberal founders of the welfare state' (Goodwin, 
1980, p.396). 
Evidently, using the law and the state as instruments to reform 
society is an ideological choice. State intervention in society through the 
law also implies a defined limit to the degree of intervention. Utopian 
political thought shows us the positive role these instruments can have; 
dystopian political thought, the negative. Anomia creates rules and 
sanctions less developed than legal ones and may permit an irrational use 
of power. Anomia creates a situation of fear and invites the tyranny of 
personal government. Law and the state are human instruments either 
for oppressing or for liberating people, and they are in our hands. 
Through law we can create Dystopia City or Eutopia Island. We choose. 
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NOTES 
1. The origin of this typology is the one proposed by Colin Davis in his book Utopia 
and the Ideal Society (1981). I have altered the titles of each ideal society, though 
Professor Davis has kindly commented on his disagreement with some of them. 
2. This typology seeks to set up distinctions between the different models of the 
ideal society, and it is founded on material, functional and historical elements. 
This typology can embrace some other typological schemas (Lewis Mumford, 
Lyman T. Sargent, Elizabeth Hansot or Judith Shklar), but it goes further because 
it resolves some of the problems that they create. 
3. For an opposing position, see Dahrendorf (1994, pp.13-S8). 
4. 'Orders' means the basic rules of a society, which cannot be transformed by the 
ordinary rule-maker. Machiavelli talked about ordini, and Neville, according to 
the republican tradition deriving from Harrington, uses this term with the same 
meaning. 
5. Joseph Raz affirms that comprehensiveness means that legal systems seek 
authority to rule all behaviour. 
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